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 TRIAL TACTICS
Rule 404(b) and Reversal 
on Appeal
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
If hard cases make bad law, strange cases sometimes produce surprising appellate decisions. One strange case that illustrates the point is United States v. Bell, 
516 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2008). The case began with a do-
mestic violence call to the police, led to a consent search 
of a home and discovery of drugs and guns, and produced 
a conviction of Brian Bell on drug and weapons charges. 
Despite the abuse of discretion standard of review and 
the usual deference appellate courts give to trial judge 
decisions with respect to the admissibility of uncharged 
crime evidence, the court of appeals reversed.
The Facts
The case began on February 23, 2004, in Cordova, 
Tennessee, when Shelby County Deputy Sheriff Wal-
ter Blaylock responded to a domestic violence com-
plaint concerning Bell and 14-year-old Amber Wil-
OLDPV%OD\FRFNIRXQG%HOODQG:LOOLDPVLQD¿JKW
Noting that the child was crying and displayed signs 
of physical injury, Blaylock arrested Bell, searched 
him, and found a bag of marijuana and $1,852 in 
cash. Blaylock secured Bell and escorted Williams 
inside her house to telephone her mother, April Arm-
strong, who was at school. Inside the house, Blaylock 
observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia, includ-
ing scales, a cutting board, and baggies on a table.
Armstrong arrived home and gave her consent to 
Blaylock to search the house. Blaylock found more 
than 11 kilograms of marijuana packaged in small 
DPRXQWVPRUHWKDQJUDPVRIFUDFNFRFDLQH¿UH-
arms, assorted ammunition, a large digital scale, bags 
of cigar “blunts” commonly used to smoke marijuana, 
DQGRWKHUHYLGHQFHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKGUXJWUDI¿FNLQJ
The government charged Bell with three crimes: 
(1) possession of 11,071.1 grams of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, (2) possession of 94.6 grams of 
crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and (3) pos-
VHVVLRQRID¿UHDUPE\DFRQYLFWHGIHORQ7KHFDVH
was tried before a jury.
Conflicting Testimony
$PEHU :LOOLDPV WHVWL¿HG WKDW VKH OLYHG ZLWK KHU
mother at the house where the drugs and guns were 
found and Bell stayed there “three or four nights 
out of the week.” He had his own room, she stated, 
where he kept personal belongings such as his pit 
bull dogs, his clothes, his cologne, and his backpack, 
and he housed his Lexus in the garage. Williams also 
WHVWL¿HG WKDW QR RQH EXW KHU KHUPRWKHU DQG%HOO
had resided in the house in the month during which 
Blaylock made his search.
Armstrong largely corroborated her daughter’s 
testimony, stating that while Bell was “in and out” he 
“lived there most of the time.” He assisted in paying 
the bills for the residence, she said, and shared her 
EHGURRP$UPVWURQJ WHVWL¿HG WKDW%HOO KDG DFFHVV
to the entire house and she agreed with her daughter 
that Bell had his own room where he stored his be-
longings. Occasionally, she stated, Bell had visitors 
to the house. Armstrong denied that the drugs and 
guns Blaylock found were hers.
%HOO FDOOHG D VLQJOH ZLWQHVV KLV ¿DQFp 'HHWD
-RKQVRQ -RKQVRQ WHVWL¿HG WKDW%HOO OLYHGZLWKKHU
and her seven-year-old son in Memphis, Tennessee, 
and stayed with her “[b]asically every night” and 
was only gone about “two nights out of the week.” 
Johnson added that Bell told her that when he was 
not with her he would stay at his aunt’s home.
Thus, at the conclusion of the government’s case-
LQFKLHIDQGWKHGHIHQVHFDVHWKHUHZDVFRQÀLFWLQJ
testimony as to whether Bell spent most of his time 
in Cordova or Memphis, and whether he essentially 
lived with Armstrong or with Johnson. If the jury 
were to believe Johnson, the prosecution’s claim 
WKDW %HOO SRVVHVVHG WKH GUXJV DQG ¿UHDUPV ZRXOG
have been weakened, as Bell’s connection with the 
house in which the evidence was found would have 
been attenuated.
Bell did not testify on his own behalf, probably 
because he had prior convictions that might well 
have been admitted to impeach him and do sub-
stantial damage to the defense. Those convictions 
EHFDPHWKHVXEMHFWRIWKH5XOHE¿JKWWKDWUH-
sulted in the reversal on appeal.
Whose Drugs and Guns?
At the conclusion of the defense case, it appears that 
there are several possible answers to the question of 
who possessed the drugs and guns:
1.  They belonged to Bell, and neither Williams 
nor Armstrong shared the possession.
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2.  They belonged to Bell, and either Williams or 
Armstrong or both shared the possession.
3.  They belonged to Bell and other associates 
of Bell, and neither Williams nor Armstrong 
shared the possession.
4.  They belonged to Bell and other associates of 
Bell, and either Williams or Armstrong or both 
shared the possession.
5.  They belonged to Williams alone.
6.  They belonged to Armstrong alone.
7.  Williams and Armstrong shared possession.
8.  They belonged to an associate of Williams 
and neither Williams nor Armstrong shared 
possession.
9.  They belonged to an associate of Williams, and 
either Williams or Armstrong or both shared 
possession.
10.  They belonged to an associate of Armstrong, 
and neither Williams nor Armstrong shared 
possession.
11.  They belonged to an associate of Armstrong, 
and either Williams or Armstrong or both 
shared possession.
12. None of the above. 
Given the fact that the drugs and drug parapher-
nalia were in plain view, explanation 12 seems un-
OLNHO\%HOOZRXOGEHJXLOW\ LIDQ\RI WKH¿UVW IRXU
explanations were true, and not guilty if any of the 
explanations from 5-12 were true. By eliciting from 
Armstrong a denial that the drugs and guns were 
hers and relying on Williams’s testimony, the gov-
ernment made the strategic decision at trial to rely 
on explanations 1 or 3 to prove guilt.
The Rule 404(b) Fight
Prior to the trial, the government moved in limine to 
admit Bell’s four prior drug convictions: (1) an Octo-
ber 16, 1997, conviction for possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute; (2) an October 16, 1997, con-
viction for possession of cocaine base with intent to 
distribute; (3) a June 18, 1999, conviction for posses-
sion of marijuana with intent to distribute; and (4) a 
June 18, 1999, conviction for possession of cocaine 
base with intent to distribute. The government argued 
that the evidence tended to prove knowledge, intent, 
and absence of mistake or accident. The trial judge 
deferred a ruling, and the government renewed its 
motion at the conclusion of the defense case.
The trial judge addressed the three issues that 
DULVHXQGHU5XOHE,VWKHUHVXI¿FLHQWHYLGHQFH
that the acts underlying the convictions occurred? Is 
the evidence admissible for a permissible purpose? 
Does the prejudicial effect substantially outweigh 
the probative value?
$IWHUGHFLGLQJWKDWWKHUHZDVVXI¿FLHQWHYLGHQFH
the judge turned to the second question and reasoned 
as follows:
The second issue deals not only with whether 
or not [the convictions] can be proved, but 
whether they—whether the government has ar-
ticulated an appropriate basis under 404(b) for 
the admission of such type—such evidence, in 
other words, whether or not they have submit-
WHGVXI¿FLHQWDUJXPHQWDQGSURRI WR WKHFRXUW
and based upon the court’s review of the record 
as to whether or not one or more of the permit-
ted admissibility bases is present. . . . I think 
it’s cited in [United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 
1253 (6th Cir. 1985)] and [United States v. Latt-
ner, 385 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 2004)] that, when 
the defendant in such a charge enters a plea of 
not guilty, basically he is putting every element, 
including the intent aspect, to the government’s 
proof. And, as well, the court believes that the 
defendant’s position in this case has been that he 
was not aware, he was—he did not know these 
drugs were there or they were planted by some-
one else, put in there by somebody else, you 
know, that this was simply he just happened to 
be—he was an innocent person in terms of their 
being present or it was a mistake or an accident 
or just happened to be there.
I think under the circumstances of what I’ve heard 
from the proof, is that the government’s submis-
sion of this evidence would go towards the issue 
of intent and absence of mistake or accident.
(516 F.3d at 438.)
The judge struck the Rule 403 balance in favor of 
the government, admitted the evidence, and gave a 
limiting instruction to the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, the court has permitted the 
introduction of testimony—or evidence, rather, 
here regarding the defendant, Mr. Bell, about com-
mitting—the commission of other crimes other 
than the ones that are charged in the indictment.
1RZ LI \RX ¿QG WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQW FRPPLWWHG
these acts, these crimes, you can consider the evi-
dence only as it relates to the government’s claim 
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on the defendant’s intent or absence of mistake or 
absence of accident. You may not consider it for 
any other purpose. And I’ll give this instruction to 
\RXDJDLQZKHQ,JLYH\RXWKH¿QDOLQVWUXFWLRQ
But remember and keep this in mind, that the de-
fendant is on trial here only for the offenses that 
he is charged with in this indictment, which again 
I will read to you. So the burden still remains on 
the government to prove its case beyond a reason-
able doubt and, again, the defendant is not on trial 
for any previous act, but only for those that are 
charged here in this indictment.
(Id.)
After the closing arguments, the judge gave a 
similar instruction before the jury was dismissed:
Now, you heard testimony that the defendant 
committed crimes other than the ones charged 
LQWKHLQGLFWPHQW,I\RX¿QGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW
did these crimes, you can consider the evidence 
only as it relates to the government’s claim on 
the defendant’s intent, absence of mistake, or 
absence of accident. You must not consider it 
for any other purpose. Now, remember that the 
defendant is on trial here for only those charges 
in the indictment and not for the other acts. Do 
not return a guilty verdict unless the govern-
ment proves the crime charged in the indict-
ment beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Id.)
The jury found Bell guilty on all three counts.
The Court of Appeals Majority
The court of appeals reversed Bell’s convictions by 
a 2-1 vote. The majority concluded that “the district 
court erred in admitting the evidence of Bell’s prior 
drug convictions for the purpose of demonstrat-
ing absence of mistake or accident and intent, and 
DEXVHG LWV GLVFUHWLRQ LQ ¿QGLQJ WKDW WKH SUREDWLYH
value of this evidence on the issue of intent was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. 
Because this error was not harmless, Bell is entitled 
to a new trial.” (Id. at 441.)
7KHFRXUW¿UVWDGGUHVVHGWKHLVVXHRIDEVHQFHRI
mistake or accident. It reasoned as follows:
Absence of mistake or accident is one of the 
permissible purposes listed in Rule 404(b). 
However, “the government’s purpose in intro-
ducing the evidence must be to prove a fact 
that the defendant has placed, or conceivably 
will place, in issue, or a fact that the statutory 
elements obligate the government to prove.” 
[United States v.] Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 
[1070] 1076 [(6th Cir. 1996)]. Thus, for other 
acts evidence to be admissible for the purpose 
of showing absence of mistake or accident, 
the defendant must assert a defense based on 
some type of mistake or accident. See United 
States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 606 (6th Cir. 
¿QGLQJDEVHQFHRIPLVWDNHQRWWREHD
permissible purpose, in a felon in possession 
case, when the defendant’s only defense was 
that the gun was not his and that he did not 
know that it was under his seat); United States 
v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 1999) (re-
jecting absence of mistake as a permissible 
purpose for the admission of evidence when 
the defendant’s “defense was not that she mis-
takenly thought she was selling powdered sug-
ar instead of cocaine”); Merriweather, 78 F.3d 
at 1077 (noting that “absence of mistake ‘on 
behalf of the government’ is not a legitimate 
basis to admit other acts evidence”).
The district court erred in concluding that the 
evidence of Bell’s prior convictions was ad-
missible for the purpose of demonstrating ab-
sence of mistake or accident. This case did not 
present an issue of mistake or accident. Bell’s 
argument was not that he was mistaken about 
the narcotic nature of the substances seized by 
the police, but rather that he never possessed 
the marijuana and crack cocaine. The district 
court recognized that there was “no indication 
from [Bell’s] arguments or anything that has 
been put on that would indicate that Mr. Bell 
knew something was there, but didn’t know it 
was drugs.” On the contrary, the district court 
believed Bell’s position to be that “he did not 
know these drugs were there or they were 
planted by someone else, put in there by some-
body else, [that] he was an innocent person in 
terms of their being present or it was a mistake 
or accident or just happened to be there.” In 
other words, Bell was claiming that it was a 
mistake for the police to think that the drugs 
were his, not that he was mistaken about the 
fact that the substances found were drugs. As 
Bell “never claimed that he was unknowingly 
dealing in cocaine or was unwittingly engag-
ing in unlawful activity,” the evidence of his 
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prior drug convictions could not be properly 
admitted for the purpose of absence of mistake 
or accident. Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1077.
(Id. at 442.)
In short, the court found that there was no defense 
claim, implicit or explicit, that Bell claimed that the 
drugs and guns were present as a result of his mistake 
or accident. His defense was that they were not his 
drugs, he was not living in the house where they were 
found, and he did not know they were there. There-
fore, the government’s rebuttal addressed an issue not 
in the case. The court of appeals deemed this legal error 
rather than abuse of discretion, since the trial judge has 
no discretion to admit evidence that is irrelevant.
The court had a different view of the admissibility 
of the prior convictions to prove intent and wrote as fol-
lows: “Proving intent . . . was a potentially legitimate 
reason for the government to offer evidence of Bell’s 
SULRUFRQYLFWLRQV5XOHEVSHFL¿FDOO\OLVWVGHPRQ-
strating a defendant’s intent as a permissible purpose. 
Moreover, Bell’s intent to possess and distribute was at 
issue because it is an element that the government must 
prove to establish possession with intent to distribute. 
. . . Accordingly, the district court properly found that 
the evidence was being offered for the admissible pur-
pose of intent and that this purpose was at issue in the 
case.” (Id. at 442-43.) Having found that the purpose 
was limited, the court added that, “whether the evi-
dence of Bell’s prior drug convictions was probative 
on the issue of intent is a closer question.” (Id. at 443.) 
The court answered the question as follows:
To determine if evidence of other acts is pro-
bative of intent, we look to whether the evi-
dence relates to conduct that is “substantially 
similar and reasonably near in time” to the 
VSHFL¿FLQWHQWRIIHQVHDW LVVXH   7KXVZH
have drawn a distinction between the proba-
tive value of prior acts of personal drug use 
and prior acts of drug distribution¿QGLQJWKH
former not to be probative of intent to possess 
and distribute. . . . 
Likewise, while we have repeatedly recognized 
that prior drug distribution evidence is admissible 
to show intent to distribute, our cases have only 
found such evidence probative of present intent 
to possess and distribute when the prior distribu-
tions were part of the same scheme or involved  
a similar modus operandi as the present offense 
. . . . Unless the past and present crime are related 
by being part of the same scheme of drug distri-
bution or by having the same modus operandi, 
the fact that a defendant has intended to possess 
and distribute drugs in the past does not logically 
compel the conclusion that he presently intends to 
possess and distribute drugs. . . .  Indeed, a person 
may be a distributor of drugs on one occasion, and 
a mere user on another. The only way to reach the 
conclusion that the person currently has the intent 
to possess and distribute based solely on evidence 
of unrelated prior convictions for drug distribution 
is by employing the very kind of reasoning—i.e., 
once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer—which 
404(b) excludes. . . . Thus, to be probative of a de-
fendant’s present intent to possess and distribute, 
his prior convictions for drug distribution must 
be related in some way to the present crime for 
which the defendant is on trial.
Here, Bell’s prior convictions were for unlawful 
possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent 
to distribute, the same type of charges at issue in 
this case. However, the convictions were for of-
fenses that occurred several years previously and 
were not alleged to be part of the same scheme 
to distribute drugs or to involve a similar modus 
operandi. Such evidence of prior distribution, 
unconnected to the present charge, is not proba-
tive of whether Bell intended to possess and dis-
tribute drugs in the instant case. Accordingly, the 
GLVWULFWFRXUWHUUHGLQ¿QGLQJHYLGHQFHRIWKHVH
prior convictions admissible for the legitimate 
purpose of proving Bell’s intent.
(Id. at 443-44; citations omitted.)
The court found that not only did the trial judge err in 
admitting the convictions to prove intent, the judge 
also abused discretion in the Rule 403 analysis:
Despite the substantial deference that must be 
afforded a lower court’s Rule 403 balancing 
GHFLVLRQZH¿QGWKDWWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWDEXVHG
its discretion in the instant case. We have al-
ready noted that the evidence of Bell’s prior 
convictions was not probative of his present 
intent to possess and distribute, the only plau-
sibly legitimate purpose for offering this evi-
dence. However, even assuming that this evi-
dence would have some probative value on the 
issue of intent, its value would be slight. Bell’s 
prior distribution of drugs several years prior 
to the instant offense does not necessarily im-
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ply that he was intending to possess and dis-
tribute drugs on this occasion. The only way 
that such evidence would be probative is if the 
jury were permitted to infer that because Bell 
has distributed drugs in the past, it is likely 
that he was doing so in the present case. Yet, 
this is the very kind of propensity reasoning 
which Rule 404(b) prohibits the jury from us-
ing in assessing the probative value of Bell’s 
prior convictions and prevents the judge from 
considering when engaging in the Rule 403 
balancing process.
(Id. at 445-46.)
The court also found that the trial judge did not 
adequately consider the other evidence of intent to 
distribute that the government possessed, including 
WKHDPRXQWRIGUXJVIRXQGDQGWKHGUXJWUDI¿FNLQJ
paraphernalia, and did not appropriately appreciate 
the weak additional probative value of the convic-
tions and the much more probable prejudice aris-
ing from the fact that “the evidence of Bell’s prior 
crimes painted a picture of Bell as a repeat drug of-
fender, greatly increasing the chance that the jury 
would punish him not for his involvement in the of-
fense at issue, but rather because he appeared to be a 
‘bad’ guy.” (Id. at 446.) 
The court found that the trial judge’s limiting in-
structions did little to ameliorate the prejudice and 
may have exacerbated the prejudice:
These instructions did remind the jury that 
Bell was on trial only for the charged offenses 
and not for his prior bad acts. However, by di-
recting the jury to consider these acts for the 
purpose of ascertaining Bell’s intent, the court 
was implicitly approving the kind of reasoning 
which would suggest that because Bell was a 
drug distributor in the past, the jury should 
consider him to have distributed drugs in the 
present case. Moreover, the court’s instruction 
created the possibility for an even greater prej-
udicial impact by directing the jury to consider 
the evidence of Bell’s prior convictions for the 
purpose of absence of mistake, a matter which 
was not even at issue in the case.
(Id. at 446-47.)
The Dissent
Judge Steeh dissented and argued that the govern-
ment was required to prove Bell’s general intent to 
knowingly and intentionally possess the drugs and 
guns and concluded that the prior convictions were 
admissible to prove that Bell did not possess them 
by mistake or accident. The dissent also argued 
WKDW%HOOE\SOHDGLQJQRWJXLOW\SXWVSHFL¿FLQWHQW
in issue as well as general intent. Since there was 
evidence that Bell resided at the residence where the 
drugs and guns were found, the dissent concluded 
that the evidence was admissible to prove knowl-
edge and intent and to negate the possibility that the 
drugs and guns were present by accident.
The Lessons
1. The majority highlights the fact that a defendant 
who claims not to have been present where the drugs 
and guns were found is not raising a defense of mis-
take or accident. The dissent urges that, by pleading 
not guilty, Bell required the government to prove 
knowledge and intent, so that, if the jury believed 
Williams and Armstrong, the government still had 
to prove that Bell knowingly and intentionally pos-
sessed the drugs and guns. The majority’s response 
is that, if the jury believed that Bell was the source of 
the drugs and guns, it surely would conclude in light 
of the quantity and circumstances that he knowingly 
and intentionally possessed them and intended to 
distribute the drugs. In sum, the majority insists on 
focusing on the actual defense and the need for gov-
ernment proof to respond to that defense.
2. The reality in this case is that the only question 
the jury really had to decide was “whose drugs and 
guns were they?” The danger in admission of the prior 
convictions is that the jury would decide that the drugs 
belonged to Bell because he was a repeat offender. This 
is predisposition use and is barred by Rule 404(b).
3. One aspect of the case that makes it strange 
is that the crucial testimony related to whether Bell 
actually lived in the home where the guns and drugs 
were found. It is not possible that Williams and 
Armstrong were truthful and accurate if Johnson’s 
testimony was crucial and accurate. The converse is 
also true. If the jury disbelieved Williams and Arm-
VWURQJRUGLGQRW¿QGWKHPVXI¿FLHQWO\FUHGLEOHWKH
government’s case was indeed weak. If Williams 
and Armstrong were not truthful, it could have been 
because they were involved with Bell, were them-
selves guilty without Bell’s involvement, or were 
involved with others. Bell’s prior convictions would 
have provided no guidance as to which of these pos-
sibilities is most likely. The prior convictions sim-
ply branded Bell as the kind of man who would deal 
drugs, and this use of the convictions does seem im-
proper under Rule 404(b). ■
